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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Elections-State Limit on
Candidate Expenditures and Campaign
Contributions Violates State Free Speech
Guarantee
I.

FACTS

AND HOLDING

Plaintiff,' a candidate for state office, sought a declaratory
judgment to invalidate the Oregon statutes2 limiting a candidate's
campaign expenditures and prohibiting any expenditures made by
1.

Warren Deras was a candidate for Oregon state representative.

2.

ORE. REV. STAT.

§ 260.027 (1) provided as follows:

(1) No political treasurer or combination of political treasurers shall make or authorize any expenditure that will cause the total amount expended in support of or
opposition to a candidate to exceed, with respect to any primary, general or other single
election:
(a) For congressional and state-wide offices, 15 cents times the number of registered voters eligible to vote for the office on the date of the previous general election;
(b) For all other offices except legislative offices, 25 cents times the number of
registered voters eligible to vote for the office on the date of the previous general election
or $1,000, whichever is greater; and
(c) For the offices of State Senator and State Representative, 25 cents times the
average number of registered voters on the date of the previous general election in all of
the senatorial and representative districts, respectively, in the state.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.154 provided:
(1) No person or political committee shall make expenditures in support of or in
opposition to a candidate except the candidate or an opposing candidate. However, a
person or political committee may make expenditures in support of a candidate if the
consent of the candidate is previously obtained, or in opposition to a candidate if the
consent of one or more other candidates for the same office is previously obtained.
(2) A person or political committee which receives contributions or makes expenditures in support of a single candidate, or in opposition to one or more candidates with
the consent of a single candidate, is not subject to ORS 260.035 to 260.162 but such
contributions and expenditures are conclusively deemed to be those of the candidate on
whose behalf they are made.
(3) Any person or political committee other than a person or political committee
described in subsection (2) of this section which receives contributions or makes expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate with his consent or the consent of any
opposing candidate is subject to ORS 260.035 to 260.162. All expenditures by any such
person or candidate shall also be considered to be contributions to and expenditures by
the candidate who has consented to them and shall be reported by the candidate as well
as by the person or committee making the expenditures.
(4) Expenses incurred by a person or political committee on behalf of more than
one candidate shall be allocated between such candidates on a reasonable basis.
(5) Expenses incurred by a political committee, not allocable to any particular
candidate or candidates, including expenses incurred in solicitation of funds intended
to be contributed to candidates to be designated later, shall not be considered expenditures in support of a candidate for purposes of subsection (1) of this section or ORS
260.027.
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others on his behalf without his prior consent.' Plaintiff claimed
that the statutes violated his freedom of speech as guaranteed by
the Oregon 4 and federal constitutions. Defendant,' charged with
administering the statutes, contended that the laws were valid,
since they merely effected an "incidental" restriction on an individual's freedom of speech. 7 He asserted that this restriction was
outweighed by the need to protect the electoral process from the
abuses engendered by unlimited campaign expenditures, including
the domination of available broadcast air-time by better financed
candidates.' The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the expenditure limitation, but held the prior-consent provision unconstitutional. On cross-appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, held, reversed in part and affirmed in part.' A state statutory scheme limiting a candidate's campaign expenditures and requiring his prior
consent to all campaign expenditures made by others on his behalf
violates the state constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541 (Ore. 1975).
3. The limitations were enforced by requiring that all campaign expenditures be made
by a "certified political treasurer," who might be the candidate himself, a person designated
by the candidate, or the treasurer of a "political committee." ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.027,
260.035-.037.
4. ORE. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be
responsible for abuse of this right.
ORE. CONST. art. I, § 26 provides:
No law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their Representatives; nor from applying to the Legislature for redress of greviances [sic].
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
The first amendment is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
6. Clay Myers was the Secretary of State of Oregon.
7. The Secretary of State argued that the restriction was incidental because the expenditure limitation did not foreclose the candidate's ability to convey his message through personal appearances, debates, press releases, and other communications with the public.
8. The Secretary of State also cited the abuses exposed during the investigations of the
1972 Republican presidential campaign, viz. burglary, bribery, illegal searches, and defamation.
9. The court also held that plaintiff should not bear the total cost of the litigation since
all members of the public benefitted equally from the invalidation of the statutes. See Gilbert
v. Hoisting Eng'r Local 701, 237 Ore. 130, 384 P.2d 136 (1963). Thus the court remanded the
case for the determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to plaintiff.
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BACKGROUND

In the 1930 decision of State ex rel. LaFollette v. Kohler,1° the
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the earliest free speech challenge
to a candidate expenditure limitation. The court held that the
state's interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process
outweighed the individual's right of communicating with the public
without governmental infringement." The court's identification of
the communicative effect of campaign spending anticipated the
2
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Stromberg v. California"
that communicative conduct was entitled to protection from government infringement. The Court, however, hampered the effectuation of this protection by failing to define conclusively the point at
which an act is sufficiently intertwined with communication to
bring it within the reach of Stromberg;13 the first amendment would
shield campaign spending only if the conduct were deemed communicative under either of two lines of authority. The older Court
authority indicated that conduct intended merely to "facilitate"
communication would fall within Stromberg. In Kovacs v. Cooper"
and Saia v. New York,' 5 the Court implicitly recognized that the
purpose of speech amplification through the use of a sound truck
was the widespread dissemination of a message." Thus the Court
conferred first amendment protection on the amplification even
though the act of amplifying did not itself incorporate a message.
The Court's more recent examinations of communicative conduct
have concerned acts specifically intended to incorporate messages.
In United States v. O'Brien,"'involving the burning of draft cards,
and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,'8 involving the wearing of symbolic arm-bands, the Court
intimated that an act would merit first amendment protection if the
actor intended that his act communicate a message 9 and if the
10. 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895 (1930).
11. The court concluded that "the law under consideration lies within the police power
field and impairs only the right of free speech . . . . [T]he restriction, everything considered, is within the field of reasonableness." Id. at 529, 228 N.W. at 914.
12. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (conviction for display of red flag as symbol of opposition to
organized government violated first amendment).
13. Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
15. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
16. Id. at 561.
17. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
18. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
19. One commentator has suggested that since the purpose of the first amendment is
to protect communication, it is logical to extend that protection to an act only when the actor
intends to convey a message thereby. Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 111011 (1968).
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actor's audience would likely understand the message."0 The Court
clarified the element of audience understanding by noting in Spence
v. Washington 1 that the message of an act might be understood
from the surrounding circumstances." Thus the Court observed that
a bizarre manner of displaying the American flag conveyed no message unless perceived against the background of the contemporaneous public furor caused by controversial incidents. 23
Even if campaign spending were deemed to be communicative
conduct, the Stromberg Court did not require that conduct be afforded the same degree of protection as pure speech. 4 This was
evident in Kovacs and Saia despite the absence of a specified standard of protection to guide the Court. In Kovacs the Court upheld
the state's regulation of the loudness of sound amplification as a
reasonable exercise of the police power.25 In Saia,however, the Court
overturned an ordinance prohibiting sound amplification because
the law limited the quantity of communicative conduct.2" Finally in
O'Brien27 the Court enunciated the rule that a substantial state
The message of the actor must be more than the mere manifestation of individuality or
idiosyncrasy. It must constitute a "contribution to the storehouse of ideas." Freeman v.
Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971) (school hair regulation did not violate first amendment); accord, New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973).
20. The first amendment does not protect communication in a vacuum. It requires both
a speaker and an audience. Pure speech or communicative conduct which is not perceived
and understood by an audience will not be protected by the first amendment. Nimmer, The
Meaning Of Symbolic Speech Under The FirstAmendment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 29, 36 (1973).
21. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
22. Id. at 410.
23. See also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-02 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(the act of sitting at a private lunch counter carriers no message unless understood as a
demonstration against enforced segregation).
24. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). Pure speech-written or spoken
communication-is protected from governmental infringement unless the words pose a clear
and present danger of creating a substantive evil that the government has a right to prevent.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
25. 336 U.S. 77, 88-89.
26. 334 U.S. 558, 562.
27. 391 U.S. 367, 377.
The Court had indicated prior to O'Brien that it was concerned primarily with the
validity rather than the substantiality of the state's interest in regulating the conduct. See
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950). Indeed, the governmental interest in O'Brien- preventing
the destruction of draft cards - was arguably less than substantial. Alfange, Free Speech
and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 17. Recently
the Court has evidenced a return to the pre-O'Brien concern with validity. Cf. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 586 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
The Court has long acknowledged the governmental interest in safeguarding elections
from the improper influence of money. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934);
cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 562 (1964); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657,
661 (1884). See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (candidates' filing fee); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax). It has been suggested that Burroughs
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interest in the regulation of the conduct would justify the state's
incidental infringement if the regulation was not intended to suppress the message and if the state had no available alternative
means that would produce a lesser infringement on freedom of
speech.2 Subsequently, the Court enlarged the O'Brien standard of29
permissible infringement in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.
Citing the finite number of channels available in the electronic communications media, the Court declared that monopolization of the
media's limited "marketplace of ideas" violated the first amendment and thus justified governmental regulation of access to the
media. 3 Four years later the Court held in ColumbiaBroadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee3 that there was no
constitutional right to purchase air-time on commercial stations for
political or public-issue advertising. Further, it has been argued
that the government should exercise its regulatory prerogative when
reflects the Court's concern about the misuse of money, not a concern about the amount of
money spent. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The
Constitutionalityof the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REv. 389, 450
(1973). Further, it is difficult to define what constitutes improper influences. Id. at 464-65.
Nevertheless, the Court is likely to respect a legislative judgment that the amount of money
spent exerts undue influence on the electoral process. See Burroughs v. United States, 290
U.S. 534, 547 (1934); Rosenthal, CampaignFinancingand the Constitution,9 HARv. J. LEGIS.
359, 387-88 (1972).
28. In assessing the possibility of less drastic alternatives, the Court generally has
refused to fashion legislative schemes for the state or to consider alternatives not already part
of the law of the state. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949). The Court may believe that it is not competent to undertake this
quasi-legislative examination of alternative means. Note, Less DrasticMeans and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 472 (1969). The Court, however, has required defendants to
prove the absence of less drastic alternatives, thus forcing judicial scrutiny of the proposals
considered inadequate by defendants. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
The Court applies two techniques to assess less drastic alternatives. By one method, the
Court identifies the common law and statutory remedies already available to the state to
achieve its ends. See, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). Because of
society's familiarity with these remedies, the state can assume that their use will provide
effective and inoffensive means to the state's ends. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 472 (1969).
By the second method, the Court rules that the state can narrow the reach of its statute
so that the allowable state end is effected without burdening free speech. United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 & n.20 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The Court
has held that a statute aimed at communicative conduct will not be overturned unless it is
substantially overbroad. Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); see Note, The Less
Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 1012 (1974).
29. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
30. Id. at 387, 390.
31. 412 U.S. 94 (1973); see Loper, Media Access and the FirstAmendment's Romantic
Tradition:A Commentary on Jerome A. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom?, 26 ME. L.
REv. 415 (1974).
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necessary to protect the electoral process from the undue influence
of air-time monopolization. 2
The first state decision to consider campaign spending limitations within this first amendment framework was Bare v. Gorton33
in 1974. The Washington Supreme Court did not consider whether
campaign spending constitutes communicative conduct. Nevertheless, the court struck down the limitations since they effected a
prohibition of campaign spending in violation of the first amendment.
Subsequent to the instant decision, however, the District of
Columbia Circuit reached the opposite result in Buckley v. Valeo.3 4
Although failing to discuss the communicative impact of campaign
spending, the court nonetheless held that the need to preserve the
purity of the electoral process through curbs on expenditures justified the resulting infringement on first amendment freedoms.
Ill.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The court observed at the outset that the statutes would have
to be assessed together since the candidate expenditure limits were
unenforceable unless coupled with the candidate's control over the
spending by others. The court next asserted that the Oregon constitution would govern in the instant case. While refusing to decide
the validity of weighing constitutional interests against state interests, the court assumed the propriety of this balancing test for the
purpose of applying it to this dispute. Noting that virtually every
public communication in a campaign requires financing,36 the court
reasoned that the expenditure limitation produced a more-thanincidental impediment to expression on public issues. The court
next cited studies suggesting that the evils of campaign spending
sought to be eradicated by the expenditure limitation were indeterminable because of the presence of other influential factors in the
electoral process. 7 Pointing to the recognized campaign abuses of
32. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, No. 73-2256 (D.C. Cir., June 2, 1975)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
33. 84 Wash. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974).
34. No. 75-1061 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 15, 1975).
35. Although the opinion noted that the federal constitution "is not controlling where
this court is of the opinion that our constitution should provide a larger measure of protection
to the citizen," 535 P.2d at 549, the court did not suggest that its decision was based upon a
view of freedom of speech which was broader than the federal first amendment.
36. See note 7 supra.
37. Among the other factors noted by the court were the predisposition of voters, the
issues in the campaign, incumbency, favorable treatment of a candidate by the press, and
the candidate's religion and race. 535 P.2d at 546-47. For a catalogue of the studies cited by
the court, see 535 P.2d at 546 n.9, 547 nn.10-12.
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burglary, bribery, illegal searches, and defamation, 3 the court declared that these were not the result of excessive expenditures3 9 and
therefore the statutes could be drawn more narrowly to reach these
problems without limiting candidate expenditures. 0 Finally the
court observed that the expenditure limitation would favor incumbents, candidates with familiar names, and candidates with leisure
time for campaigning. Thus the court concluded that the infringement of free speech and the availability of a less restrictive alternative rendered the statutes violative of the Oregon free speech guarantee.
IV.

COMMENT

Although the instant court's analysis was not buttressed by
citation to relevant judicial authority, its ultimate conclusion appears correct. The court failed at the outset to consider whether
candidate expenditures or campaign contributions constitute communicative conduct protected under Stromberg. It would appear
that such spending does not satisfy the O'Brien-Tinker standard41
since the conveyance of money is not intended to incorporate a
message. It seems clear, however, that the Kovacs-Saia "facilitation" standard 2 defines the minimal acceptable connection between
conduct and communication, and can be employed to determine the
protection afforded the various types of campaign spending. Campaign contributions clearly are intended to subsidize the candidate's access to the means of public communication. Likewise,
many of the candidate's expenditures are directed toward the purchase of radio and television time, newspaper space, posters and
other literature, sound trucks, and other means of speech dissemination. These forms of spending fulfill the Kovacs-Saia criterion
because they facilitate the candidate's communication with the
public. Other types of campaign spending, such as rental payments
and employee salaries, probably are related too tenuously to the
candidate's communication to satisfy Kovacs-Saia.
The state's interest in regulating spending does not appear to
38. See note 8 supra.
39. The specially concurring opinion asserted that elections could be tainted by the
improper influence of money, noting that the attempted nondisclosure of "Watergate" was
made possible by large sums of money. Although the opinion argued that this improper
influence justified some limitation on campaign financing, it viewed the prior consent provision of the Oregon scheme as an unconstitutional infringement of free speech.
40. The court suggested that public subsidy of campaign costs would be "at least as
effective as direct restrictions and. . . less clearly subject to constitutional attack." 535 P.2d
at 549 n.18.
41. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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rise to the level of substantiality required by O'Brien." The court
correctly observed that the uncertain influence of money on elections weakens the state's claim that regulation of spending alone
will remedy the perceived abuses.44 The court failed to discern, however, that a candidate's monopolization of available broadcast airtime, which tends to distort the electoral process, is one abuse directly attributable to the candidate's unlimited purchasing of airtime. The state possesses a clear and substantial interest in preventing that monopolization through appropriate remedies. One such
remedy is provided by Red Lion and Columbia Broadcasting
System, which sanction the government's limitation of the quantity
of air-time made available for purchase by individuals seeking to
disseminate political views.4 5 Unlike the overbroad general candidate expenditure restriction, this Red Lion limit will not infringe
upon the candidate's ability to employ other means of communicative conduct in disseminating his ideas.
A federal solution to air-time monopolization, however, does
not guide the states in confronting the remaining problems perceived in unlimited campaign spending. Assuming arguendo that
the state can show a substantial interest in regulating the spending,
the expenditure limitation still would effectively restrict the quantity of that communicative conduct. This would produce an infringement on speech identical to that condemned in Saia 6 and
clearly exceeding O'Brien's allowance for incidental infringement.4"
Thus any limitation on contributions to candidates or on a candidate's communicative expenditures would violate the spender's first
amendment rights.
The expenditure limits also have the practical defect of penalizing a candidate not possessed of incumbency or a name familiar to
the public. These restrictions complicate a candidate's efforts to
overcome this disadvantage by curbing communicative spending,
the single method by which he can close the gap. It is noteworthy
that an air-time limit under Red Lion would impose nearly the same
burden on the unfamiliar candidate since the broadcast of messages
likely would be his most effective means of overcoming the handicap.
This decision does not augur well for state regulation of cam43. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1256-57 (1975).
But see Comment, The Constitutionalityof Restrictions on Individual Contributionsto Candidates in Federal Elections, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1631-33 (1974).
45. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
46. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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paign spending. It is unlikely that a less restrictive alternative can
be fashioned to achieve the same end. Proposals such as public
funding of campaigns 8 cannot address the perceived abuses of unlimited spending since the first amendment will not permit a funding ceiling. Further, the state's permissible regulation of noncommunicative spending, such as rental payments and employee salaries, seems unlikely to have a noticeable impact on campaign practices. Thus the states' efforts to remedy campaign abuses must be
confined to methods that do not limit communicative spending.49
ROBERT

L.

TEICHER

Constitutional Law-Search and SeizureWarrant Required for Electronic Surveillance of
Domestic Groups Having No Direct Relationship
with Foreign Powers Even When National
Security Is Involved
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs, sixteen members of the Jewish Defense League
(JDL),' sued defendant Mitchell, then Attorney General of the
United States, and nine special agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2 for damages arising from electronic surveillance of
plaintiffs' telephone conversations.' Plaintiffs alleged that the surveillance, conducted without a warrant, violated both their fourth
amendment rights4 and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
48. For a general discussion of this subject, see Fleishman, PublicFinancingof Election
Campaigns: Constitutional Constraintson Steps Toward Equality of PoliticalInfluence of
Citizens, 52 N.C.L. REV. 349 (1973).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (disclosure of lobbyist
activities). For a discussion of other methods of campaign regulation, see Rosenthal,
Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359, 417-21 (1972) (e.g., public
subsidy of campaign costs, limitiations on advertising rates charged by communications
media).
1. The Jewish Defense League is a domestic organization whose activities have included
calling world attention to the plight of Soviet Jewry. See, e.g., Schwartz, Threats and
Bombs-A Nasty Phase for the Two Nations, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, § 4 at 3, col. 1.
2. Actions alleging illegal searches and seizures by law enforcement officers now may
be brought directly against the federal government. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
3. Plaintiffs' telephone conversations were monitored by electronic devices over a period
of 208 days during October 1970 and from January 5, 1971 to June 30, 1971.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
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Safe Streets Act of 1968. 5 Defendants contended that plaintiff's
domestic acts of protest affected relations between the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.' Defendants
therefore alleged that since the surveillance was authorized by the
President pursuant to his constitutional power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, 7 neither plaintiffs' constitutional nor their statutory rights were violated.' On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rendered judgment for defendants, holding
that prior judicial approval of electronic surveillance is not required
when the executive branch has ascertained a threat to the nation's
security from foreign powers? On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held, reversed and
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Plaintiffs sued under a federal cause of action arising from the fourth amendment. See Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). Section 2520 relates to the availability of recovery of
civil damages:
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such
communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate
of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a
complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or under any
other law.
6. Defendants' contention was based on the reaction of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to JDL activities protesting Soviet emigration policies concerning Jews. Individual
members of the JDL conducted lawful demonstrations, as well as unlawful acts that included
the bombing of the New York offices of a Soviet trade organization and the Soviet airline.
The justification for the surveillance was the vehement protest of the Soviet Union to the
United States government, which led the Attorney General to believe that the JDL's continuing activities could lead to international embarrassment or possible reprisals against United
States citizens residing in the Soviet Union.
7. See text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
8. Defendants claimed that 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) denied plaintiffs a statutory cause of
action. Section 2511(3) provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional powers of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained
in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
9. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973).
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remanded.'" A warrant must be obtained prior to instituting electronic surveillance of a domestic organization that is neither an
agent of nor a collaborator with a foreign power, even when the
surveillance is to be installed under presidential authority to protect the national security in foreign affairs. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

II.

BACKGROUND

Constitutional challenges to interceptions of private communications by electronic surveillance devices" arose soon after the federal government instituted that practice in criminal investigations. 2
In Olmstead v. United States,'3 the Supreme Court found no fourth
amendment barriers to the use of a wiretap since no trespass to the
victim's "home or curtilege" had occurred." The first significant
restriction'" on wiretapping was statutory-section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,16 which imposed criminal sanctions for the interception and divulgence of wire communications
without the consent of the sender. 7 Until 1967, however, the constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping remained subject only to the
Olmstead trespass requirement.'" In Berger v. New York'" and Katz
0 the Supreme Court abandoned the Olmstead
v. United States,"
10. The case was remanded to determine the existence of any defenses available to
defendants under either the statutory or federal cause of action. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1970) and note 4 supra.
11. Prior to the decision in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), electronic
eavesdropping was distinguished from wiretapping. Wiretaps involve the interception of communications by attaching a listening device to the line through which the communication is
being transmitted, while electronic eavesdropping is the interception of spoken communications through an electronic device that amplifies the sound waves it picks up.
12. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 17, col. 4.
13. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14. Id. at 466.
15. Since a wiretap could be instituted without the occurrence of a trespass, Olmstead
in effect held that there was no constitutional barrier to this type of surveillance. The practice
of eavesdropping, however, was hindered by the Olmstead holding until technological developments led to devices that could intercept conversations from greater distances away from
the speaker.
16. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1970).
17. The Supreme Court subsequently held that § 605 prohibited wiretap evidence accumulated by state or federal officers from being introduced in state or federal courts. Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
18. Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (no fourth amendment
violation since no trespass occurred) with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(fourth amendment violated when electronic eavesdropping device penetrated suspect's
wall).
19. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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reasoning and held that both wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping were searches and seizures, thus subject to the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. 21 In response to Katz and
Berger,2 2 Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 Title IlI limits the use of electronic
surveillance to delineated police purposes, 24 and provides procedural
guidelines to satisfy fourth amendment requirements. 5 In addition,
because Katz specifically omitted any mention of the national security issue, 26 section 2511(3) of Title III prevents limitation of the
President's constitutional power to protect national security by the
warrantless use of electronic surveillance devices.Y
The President's claimed constitutional power to conduct warrantless foreign security electronic surveillance 28 arises from his in21. Included in the standard of reasonableness are the standards of probable cause and
prior judicial approval of the search. Berger invalidated a New York eavesdropping statute
partially because it did not require a prior showing of probable cause that a particular offense
was being committed. 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967). Katz required that a warrant be obtained before
the commencement of electronic surveillance in criminal cases. 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1967).
The fourth amendment does not always require prior judicial review of searches. Several
exceptions have been enumerated including (1) searches made of an individual and the
immediate vicinity incident to his arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), (2)
searches made in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),
and (3) searches made with probable cause in which the exigencies of the situation render
the procurement of a warrant unreasonable, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
22. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
24. Except as otherwise provided within the statute, Title III outlaws all electronic
surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970). Interception of communications by federal officers
is permissible if the investigation concerns the commission of certain crimes, including sabotage, treason, narcotics offenses and interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises. Id. §
2516.
25. Id. § 2518.
26. 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967). Justice White, concurring, advocated that in national
security cases, the Court should leave the determination of the surveillance's reasonableness
to the President or to the Attorney General. Id. at 364. Justice Douglas, concurring in a
separate opinion, strongly disagreed. He noted that the role of the executive branch as prosecutor or adversary prevents it from acting as a disinterested magistrate. Id. at 360.
27. See note 7 supra. Since the distinction is relevant for purposes of this Comment,
"foreign security" will refer to threats to the government arising directly or indirectly from
foreign powers. "Domestic security" will refer to threats to the government arising from
domestic subversive groups, unconnected to any foreign power. "National security" will be
used as a generic term referring to threats to the government, regardless of origin.
28. The Executive also claims a historical justification for warrantless national security
electronic surveillances. President Franklin Roosevelt first justified the use of warrantless
wiretaps, although prohibited by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, in a memorandum
to then Attorney General Jackson, proposing that surveillance be limited to suspected subversives and spies. The President further directed that the surveillances be confined, when
possible, to aliens. Confidential Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General
Jackson, May 21, 1940, quoted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, App. A, at 673-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). President Truman extended the authorization to situations in which the domestic
security was threatened, or in which human life was endangered. Letter from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President Harry S. Truman, July 17, 1946, id. at 674. President Johnson,
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herent powers in the field of foreign affairs29 and as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. 0 The extent of the President's foreign
affairs power emanates from the recognition that he must act as the
sole representative of the nation when dealing with foreign powers.3 1
This role exempts his conduct of foreign relations from limitations
on delegation established by the separation of powers in the Constitution.32 Nevertheless, the foreign affairs power of the President
seemingly is constricted by the guarantees of protection from government oppression in the Bill of Rights. 33 In domestic affairs, however, the President must operate under the system of checks and
balances, and thus his inherent power is far more circumscribed. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,34 the Court assessed the
constitutional validity of the President's seizure of domestic steel
mills during the Korean War under his power as Chief Executive
and as Commander in Chief. The Court held the seizure unconstitutional because the usurpation of the legislative power to take private
property for public use without congressional authorization was in
excess of the powers delegated to the executive branch,3 5 and thus
placed strictures on the Executive's power to act in domestic matters even during an emergency.
however, significantly limited this policy. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, from President Lyndon B. Johnson, id. at 674-75.
29. He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors.. . . U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
[He] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ....
Id., art. II, § 3.
30. "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States .

. ." Id., art. II, § 2.

31. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
32. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 253 (1972). In Curtiss-Wrightthe
Court stated:
Not only .. .is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential
character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of
the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation. 299 U.S. 304, 319.
33. Curtiss-Wright dealt with the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of
power, but the Court noted that the President's power in foreign affairs, "like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution." Id. at 320. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1957), the Court held that
constitutional rights could not be denied to civilian dependents of armed forces personnel
overseas by treaties negotiated by the executive branch, giving military courts jurisdiction
over the criminal acts of the civilian dependents.
34. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
35. Id. at 587-89. Two members of the Court found no inherent legislative powers in
the Executive. Under Justice Jackson's test, the extent of presidential power would be dependent upon whether the President acts in an emergency situation and whether Congress had
acted previously in the field. No majority opinion emerged from the case.
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In the domestic security area, the Supreme Court first encountered the issue of inherent presidential power to protect the national
security through warrantless wiretaps in United States v. United
States District Court (the Keith decision).3 The government contended that Congress, in passing section 2511(3), affirmatively authorized the President to conduct warrantless wiretapping of domestic dissidents who threatened the national security. Rejecting this
contention, the Court held that section 2511(3) does not constitute
an affirmative grant of power to the President, but indicates instead
that Congress did not legislate with respect to this area. 37 The Court,
therefore, did not feel compelled to determine whether legislation
conferring such power on the President would be within the constitutional authority of Congress. Rather, the Court addressed the
issue whether electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant
was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Balancing the President's duty to protect domestic security against the potential for
infringing on first 3 l and fourth amendment rights, the Court found
that the requirement of obtaining a warrant prior to instituting
electronic surveillance would not hinder the President's performance of his duty. Consequently, the Court held that the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment demands the traditional
safeguard of prior judicial review of electronic surveillance when the
national security threat is purely internal.
Keith, however, avoided the issue of warrantless surveillance in
situations involving foreign affairs."9 Cases that have confronted the
issue evidence a trend to allow the executive branch a wide range
of discretion. In United States v. Brown,4" the district court declined
to review the government's claim that evidence gathered by warrantless wiretapping was a product of foreign intelligence-gathering,
holding that the court should not question the Executive's determination that the search was reasonable. Likewise, the Third Circuit,
in United States v. Butenko,4 1 held that warrantless wiretaps employed solely for foreign intelligence-gathering were reasonable
under the fourth amendment as a matter of law. Balancing the
possibility of abuse of warrantless surveillances against the
36. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Judge Damon J. Keith presided over the proceedings at the
district court level.
37. 407 U.S. at 302-08.
38. The Court feared that public awareness of warrantless surveillance may lead to a
restraint on constitutionally protected speech. "[P]rivate dissent, no less than open disclosure, is essential to our free society." Id. at 314; see 56 CORNELL L. REv. 161 (1970).
39. 407 U.S. at 321-22.
40. 317 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. La. 1970), afl'd, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.1973); see United
States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
41. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
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government's need for information, the court stated that executive
restraint in authorizing wiretaps, rather than prior judicial review,
was the more desirable alternative. Under this analysis, a court
would be forced to accept the government's assertion that a warrantless electronic surveillance involving foreign security
intelligence-gathering was reasonable under the fourth amendment.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant court initially decided that the Supreme Court's
holding in Keith was not dispositive because the justification advanced for the surveillance in the instant case involved the exercise
of the President's power in the field of foreign affairs. Although the
JDL clearly was a domestic organization with no foreign ties, the
court found that the JDL's activities, involving a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, affected the foreign
security of the nation.42 Departing from the Butenko analysis, the
decision focused on whether the extent of the President's authority
in the field of foreign affairs included the power to determine the
reasonableness of a search and seizure conducted pursuant to his
duty of protecting the national security. The court first answered
defendants' contention that the weight of historical and judicial
precedent indicated that judicial review of executive actions in the
field of foreign affairs was inappropriate. While recognizing the
President's extensive powers in that field, the court found that the
domestic actions of the executive branch are not immune from constitutional limitations, and therefore are subject to judicial review.43
The court then considered whether the fourth amendment compelled the executive branch to obtain judicial approval prior to undertaking electronic surveillance in the field of foreign affairs. While
recognizing that the fourth amendment reasonableness standard
does not always require the prior approval of a magistrate, the court
indicated that extreme exigency or probable frustration of the
search usually must be demonstrated in such instances." Following
42. 516 F.2d 594, 652.
43. The instant court answered defendants' contention that the practice of instituting
warrantless wiretaps begun during the Roosevelt admininistration constituted an affirmative
assertion that national security surveillance was not subject to the warrant procedure by
stating that exceptions to fourth amendment requirements cannot be grounded in mere
expediency. With regard to the contention that the President's foreign affairs powers justify
warrantless surveillance, the instant court noted that in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the Supreme Court struck down the President's attempted usurpation of legislative
powers. The instant court analogized the executive branch's attempt to usurp the judiciary's
duty to review proposed searches and seizures to Youngstown, holding that constitutional
review of the President's action was appropriate. 516 F.2d at 620-27.
44. Id. at 631.
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the Keith analysis, the court weighed the possible frustration of the
government's legitimate interest in gathering foreign intelligence
information against the individual's interest in protecting his first
and fourth amendment rights. The central argument advanced by
the court 45 militating against the imposition of a warrant requirement was the lack of judicial expertise to make informed decisions
regarding complex foreign matters." Nevertheless, the court
believed that because of the judiciary's sensitivity to the importance
of legitimate information-gathering, government needs would not be
frustrated. 47 The court then considered the possibility of security
leaks and the attendant delay in judicial review of proposed electronic surveillances, but was not persuaded that the executive
branch's interest would be hindered by a warrant requirement.4"
Noting the presumption that a search and seizure is unreasonable
unless approved whenever practicable49 by a judicial officer, and
citing Keith, the court also observed that warrantless wiretapping
has the effect of "chilling" first amendment rights of expression and
association by implanting fear of governmental intrusion into private conversations. 0 The court found that the potentially debilitat45. Since defendants did not advance any factors indicating that the warrant procedure
would unduly frustrate the government's interest in gathering foreign intelligence information, the court presented rationales suggested by other courts and commentators to justify
warrantless national security surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. United States District
Court, (the Keith decision), 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Note, ForeignSecurity Surveillanceand the
Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976 (1974).
46. 516 F.2d 594, 639.
47. The instant court recognized that in the field of foreign affairs, any uncertainty in
a judge's mind almost certainly would be resolved in favor of issuing the warrant to the
government. Another contention advanced was that in the case mistakes are made by the
judiciary about the importance of a surveillance in this field, the possible societal ramifications are far greater than in a criminal case or a case involving domestic security. The court
felt that here, also, any mistakes most likely would be made in favor of the government. Id.
at 641-47.
48. The instant court felt that a warrant proceeding could be limited to the judge, and
all administrative personnel could be supplied by the government to minimize the danger of
security leaks. The possibility of delay frustrating the government's interest in a surveillance
was seen by the instant court as minimal because in exigent circumstances, warrantless
surveillance would be reasonable under the fourth amendment. See note 21 supra. Furthermore, 'the instant court noted that most foreign surveillances are of the ongoing intelligence-gathering type, and thus not directed at the prevention of specific crimes. Thus, the
court recognized that the time element in these cases would not be crucial. Another contention militating against the instant court's imposing a warrant requirement was that the nonprosecutorial nature of the surveillances offended the fourth amendment less than searches
made in a criminal context. The instant court answered by noting that the government did
use such surveillances for prosecuting crimes, and recognized that if information is gathered
from noncriminals without a warrant in the interest of foreign security, their fourth amendment rights would receive less protection than those of criminals. Id. at 647-50.
49. Id. at 631.
50. Id. at 633-36.
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ing effect on individual liberties outweighed the government's interest in engaging in warrantless foreign security surveillances and
held that when the subject of surveillance is a domestic organization
having no direct relationship to a foreign power, a warrant is re5
quired before electronic surveillance is instituted. '
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision is significant in that it represents the first
judicial limitation of presidential power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance in any situation involving foreign security. 2 The
court, by balancing the government's need to gather information for
foreign intelligence purposes against the individual's constitutional
freedom from unreasonable government intrusion, correctly defined
presidential powers as subject to the fourth amendment. Without
such a limitation, the decision to institute foreign security surveillance of a domestic organization would depend entirely upon presidential prerogative, as exercised by the Attorney General. If left
unfettered, the Attorney General's power necessarily would deter
individuals from exercising their right to associate for the purpose
of peaceful dissent against foreign policy. Further, the power to
wiretap without judicial restraint might be utilized for politically
motivated intelligence-gathering directed at United States citizens.
The possibility of these and other abuses of individual freedoms by
the government, even under the claim of foreign security, must be
carefully tempered by judicial evaluation of the competing policies.53
The instant case presents the important question whether the
imposition of a warrant requirement actually provides any real protection to the fourth amendment rights of those subjected to electronic surveillance. 4 The instant court noted that the judiciary pos51. The instant court admitted that its analysis provided the basis for the contention
that all foreign security surveillances should be subject to a warrant requirement, absent
exigent circumstances. In cases including investigation of the criminal acts of a domestic
group, however, the court did not doubt the competency of the judiciary to determine the
reasonableness of the requested warrant. Also, the danger of security leaks was seen as
negligible, since the JDL had no contacts with the Soviet Union, and thus could not be
expected to impart any strategic information. Id. at 654.
52. The modern interdependence among nations entails the involvement of many levels
of society in international affairs, from athletic teams to trade unions. To allow the Attorney
General the discretion to employ warrantless electronic surveillance against these groups
because their activities affect the nation's foreign relations provides too great a potentiality
for abuse of individual rights.
53. The issue whether the warrant requirement should be extended into other areas of
foreign security surveillance, including wiretaps to prevent security leaks and surveillance of
foreign agents and collaborators, is not considered by this Comment.
54. In 1971, over 800 cases of electronic surveillance were reviewed by the judiciary
without a single denial of a warrant application. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 17, col. 4.
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sessed only limited expertise in foreign affairs matters and that
deference to executive competency may be necessary;55 such deference arguably would limit a judge's scrutiny of the government's
justification for the proposed surveillance. Furthermore, since much
of foreign security surveillance is ongoing intelligence-gathering, not
directed toward criminal prosecutions, knowledge of the surveillance may never become public; in such cases the government could
ignore the warrant requirement without discovery. Nevertheless, an
examination of the practical effects of a warrant requirement,
possible standards for issuance of warrants, and procedural safeguards that could accompany a wiretap order suggests that infringements upon individual rights can be limited.
A practical effect of the warrant requirement would be to reduce the number of warrantless searches that otherwise would remain secret. A law-abiding executive official could be expected to
apply for warrants for all proposed surveillances, even one not likely
to be discovered. Thus the rights of the individual subjected to
surveillance would be protected by substantive and procedural safeguards imposed by the reviewing judge. To deter government officials who would act expeditiously rather than lawfully, criminal
penalties should be greater for defying a denial of a warrant application, or for bypassing the warrant procedure completely, than for a
post hoc judicial determination that a warrantless wiretap was an
unreasonable exercise of presidential power. Furthermore, adverse
public opinion could be expected if warrantless wiretapping of citizens was exposed, especially since the executive branch would be
deprived of an honest-mistake excuse concerning the extent of presidential power. 6
The establishment of meaningful standards by which courts
could examine warrant applications would further insure the protection of individual rights. The instant court noted that the standards
of probable cause set forth in Title III often would not be applicable
to foreign security surveillances, since many interceptions are not
directed at specific criminal activity.57 In Keith, the Supreme Court
recognized that this also would be true in domestic security cases,
and suggested that Congress could tailor standards to meet the
needs of national security. For such congressional action to be
effective, the standards enacted must be sufficiently flexible to
apply to both information-gathering and prosecution-oriented
55. 516 F.2d 594, 645.
56. Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARv. L. Rnv.
976 (1974).
57. 516 F.2d at 655-57.
58. 407 U.S. at 322-24.
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surveillances, and a court would have to consider each situation
individually to accommodate the governmental interest while protecting individual rights from unreasonable infringement. Factors
to be utilized in the court's determination of the reasonableness of
a proposed search should include the utility of the information
sought in light of the government's goal of preserving national security, the probability of such information being obtained from the
proposed surveillance, the extent of invasion of the subject's privacy, and the availability of the same information by means other
than electronic surveillance.5 9 By considering these factors, a court
could prohibit searches of domestic groups instituted for political
reasons, while allowing the executive branch to continue surveillance of groups whose subversive activities threaten national security.
Even if the judiciary fails to fulfill its proper role as a disinterested arbiter by deferring to the government's interest in obtaining
information, procedural safeguards accompanying the issuance of a
warrant can insure accountability of the executive branch and prevent abuses of individual rights."0 Title HI provides a number of
protections that would limit infringement of individual rights if
made applicable to national security wiretaps. The statute imposes
a time limit on the duration of the surveillance,"1 with provisions for
renewal by the judge. Recordings of the interception are to be
made,"2 and all records of the warrant procedure are preserved.63
Additionally, the subject must be notified of the surveillance after
it is discontinued. 4 Such features, in conjunction with criminal65
and civil" penalties provided by Title III, would have the beneficial
effect of limiting unjustifiable intrusions into the privacy of citizens.
The requirement of judicial review, along with the imposition
of meaningful standards for issuing warrants and procedural safeguards to minimize intrusions into the privacy of individuals, would
limit the potentiality for abuse inherent in the use of electronic
surveillance. Requiring the government to submit to prior judicial
review of proposed electronic surveillances, at least where the sub59. 516 F.2d at 657-59.
60. Nesson, Aspects of the Executive's Power over NationalSecurity Matters: Security
Classificationsand Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399, 415 (1974).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970). (The time allotted is limited to no longer than necessary

to achieve the objective of the surveillance, and in no case longer than 30 days).
62.

Id. § 2518(8)(a).

63. Id. § 2518(8)(b).
64.

Id. § 2518(8)(d).

65. Id. § 2511(1). (The penalties include fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to 5
years, or both.).
66. Id. § 2520; see note 5 supra.
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jects have no direct relationship with a foreign power, lessens the
threat to individual rights that unchecked foreign security power
otherwise would pose.
TIMOTHY COLLINS MAGUIRE

